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MAL-WHO? MAL-WHAT? MAL-WHERE? 
THE FUTURE CYBER-THREAT OF A NON-FICTION 
NEUROMANCER: LEGALLY UN-ATTRIBUTABLE, CYBERSPACE-
BOUND, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES 
Jonathan A. Schnader* 
For decades, science fiction writers have tackled philosophical 
and existential questions arising from the creation of artificial 
intelligence (“AI”) by human beings. AI, however, is no longer a 
fictional concept, but rather an evolving part of modern society. 
How will AI systems impact United States’ national security 
interests? Considering the increased national security threat 
coming from actors in cyberspace, policymakers should consider 
the cybersecurity risk of AI systems that operate entirely in 
cyberspace. This article opines that a serious threat to national 
security will arise from a cyberspace-bound, decentralized 
autonomous entity (“CyDAE”) because of the “unexplainability” of 
current AI system design (that is, the difficulty understanding why 
or how the AI arrived at its conclusion or behaved the way it did), 
the lack of legal personhood arrangements for autonomous systems, 
and the already difficult task of attributing acts in cyberspace to 
human actors or States because of outdated Westphalian notions of 
sovereignty and territoriality. The article ultimately offers several 
broad policy suggestions, including: (1) an AI registry; (2) 
“explainability” criteria for AI system designs; (3) requiring human 
oversight for legal personhood arrangements (whether arranged in 
a corporation, limited liability structure, or otherwise) tailored 
specifically for AI autonomous systems that lack human members; 
and (4) universal jurisdiction of States over malicious CyDAEs that 
obfuscate attributive links to human actors or States. 
 
 *  B.A. Miami University of Ohio, 2008; J.D. Syracuse University College of 
Law, 2012; LL.M. in National Security, Georgetown University Law Center, 
2019. Many thanks to David Flynn and Professor David Koplow for their 
encouragement and support. 
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 1 Christian Horak, The Future (Of Finance) Is Already Here–It’s Just Not 
Evenly Distributed, DIGITALIST MAG. (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.digitalistmag.com/finance/2017/06/01/the-future-of-finance-is-
already-here-its-just-not-evenly-distributed-05126253 [https://perma.cc/JC9J-
RAGY] (referring to a quote by William Gibson originally published in The 
Economist on December 4, 2003). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The science fiction “cyberpunk” author William Gibson 
predicted a future where the rise of powerful, disembodied artificial 
intelligences, living in the intangible world of “cyberspace,”2 
willfully act with difficult-to-determine purposes and opaque (or 
non-existent) human affiliations and loyalties.3 Stunningly, Gibson 
depicts a world of sensory overload where these artificial 
intelligences manipulate humans for their own ends, commit crimes 
in cyberspace, digitally spar with human hackers, and launch attacks 
with kinetics effects, all while grappling with existential issues of 
self and other philosophical quandaries.4 Despite its almost 
shocking overlap with the trajectory of technological development, 
specifically artificial intelligence, Neuromancer’s haunting future 
world has not yet fully materialized. But, as former Assistant 
Attorney General John Carlin recently noted: “I think it’s instructive 
now to look to movies, to look to science-fiction as we try to think 
what the next threats are going to be and how we can prepare for 
them.”5 
The rise of artificial intelligence (“AI”) has changed, is 
changing, and will change the world, from politics, to social 
 
 2 Gibson continued to issue prophetic and hyper-relevant quotes about the 
present and future of technology, even twenty years after the release of his 
influential novel Neuromancer: “ ‘Cyberspace’ is a word that’s increasingly long 
in the teeth as the reality becomes more ubiquitous by the day.” Joseph Walsh, 
Meeting William Gibson, the Father of Cyberpunk, VICE (Dec. 5, 2014), 
https://www.vice.com/sv/article/bn5k5m/william-gibson-interview-399 
[https://perma.cc/EKZ9-XBUQ]. 
 3 See generally WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (Penguin Random House 
2018) (1984). In this science-fiction masterpiece, an “artificial general 
intelligence” (“AGI”) entity called “Wintermute,” hires a human hacker to 
achieve his only purpose for existence, to merge with another AGI called 
“Neuromancer.” 
 4 Id. 
 5 Tomayto, Tomahto: Right to Be Forgotten Meets Right to Die, CYBERLAW 
PODCAST (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.steptoe.com/feed-Cyberlaw.rss 
[https://perma.cc/7DX8-8G6P]. 
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interaction, to economics. However, it is important to note AI will 
have a tremendous effect on governments and nation-States 
(“States”), particularly on the difficulties AI will pose to national 
security. The current presidential administration’s recent decree6 
highlights the importance of AI dominance to the United States’ 
national security interests. 
The application of AI to national security related matters ranges 
from autonomous weapons systems7 to AI-powered facial 
recognition8 to countering terrorist recruitment using AI and 
machine learning.9 The intersection between cybersecurity and AI is 
a major area of concern.10 The past decade has seen an exponential 
increase of malicious cyber-activities, orchestrated by both State 
and non-State actors alike. Indeed, the Director of National 
Intelligence (“DNI”) announced “cyber” to be the first global threat 
in this year’s Worldwide Threat Assessment:  
Our adversaries and strategic competitors will increasingly use cyber 
capabilities – including cyber espionage, attack, and influence – to seek 
political, economic, and military advantage over the United States . . . . 
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea increasingly use cyber operations 
to threaten both minds and machines in an expanding number of ways – 
 
 6 Exec. Order No. 13,859, 3 C.F.R. § 3967 (2019) (“Continued American 
leadership in AI is of paramount importance to maintaining the economic and 
national security of the United States and to shaping the global evolution of AI in 
a manner consistent with our Nation’s values, policies, and priorities.”). 
 7 See generally PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE, AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND 
THE FUTURE OF WAR (2018). 
 8 See, e.g., Sahil Chinoy, We Built ‘Unbelievable’ (but Legal) Facial 
Recognition Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2019/04/16/opinion/facial-recognition-new-york-city.html 
[https://perma.cc/SA67-QTK4]. 
 9 Natasha Lomas, Google to Ramp Up AI Efforts to ID Extremism on YouTube, 
TECHCRUNCH (June 19, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/19/ 
google-to-ramp-up-ai-efforts-to-id-extremism-on-youtube/ 
[https://perma.cc/5YP5-QAQE]. 
 10 Michael C. Horowitz et al., Artificial Intelligence and International Security, 
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to steal information, to influence our citizens, or to disrupt critical 
infrastructure.”11  
In a recent talk, former FBI Director James Comey reflected on 
threats from his tenure: “we see an explosion in nation-state 
adversaries and near nation-state actors using the digital vector to 
steal all kinds of information and to prepare things that were near to 
kinetic acts of war.”12 
Indeed, “attribution,” that is, determining who, or potentially 
what, is responsible for a malicious cyber-activity, is already an 
incredibly difficult task. There are three types of attribution: 
political,13 technical, and legal. “Technical attribution” is 
characterized “as determining the identity or location of an attacker 
or an attacker’s intermediary.”14 Legal attribution “refers to the 
assignment of responsibility for an ‘internationally wrongful act to 
a state’ ” or non-State actor.15 Legal attribution requires some 
degree of technical attribution; there must be some evidence linking 
an actor to the cyber-attack, otherwise the cyber-attack cannot be 
qualified as State sponsored or not. Thus, it is important to 
understand the strategies for technical attribution, as well as the 
 
 11 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing 
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of 
Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence), https://www.hsdl.org/ 
?view&did=820727 [https://perma.cc/TQ3N-6JWP] [hereinafter “Worldwide 
Threat Assessment”]. 
 12 Bonus Edition: James Comey at Verify 2019, LAWFARE PODCAST (Apr. 11, 
2019, Minute 7:20), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-bonus-
edition-james-comey-verify-2019 [https://perma.cc/5A6E-ZEME]. 
 13 Political attribution refers to the decision from a diplomatic or policy 
standpoint to assign blame to a particular State, group, or individual for a cyber-
event. The question of political attribution is a foreign relations decision, and 
irrelevant for the purposes of the instant analysis. 
 14 DAVID A. WHEELER & GREGORY N. LARSEN, INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSIS, 
TECHNIQUES FOR CYBER ATTACK ATTRIBUTION (Oct. 2003), 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a468859.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6YK-
63VE]. 
 15 Jason Jolley, Attribution, State Responsibility, and the Duty to Prevent 
Malicious Cyber-Attacks in International Law (Oct. 21, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3056832 
[https://perma.cc/469P-4KHN]. 
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mechanism used by malign cyber actors to frustrate any efforts to 
link them to a particular cyber operation. 
The emergence of AI has further complicated cyber-attribution 
issues. Last year, the first AI driven cyber-attack was reported in 
India. The attack “used rudimentary machine learning to observe 
and learn patterns of normal user behavior inside a network . . . then 
began to mimic that normal behavior, effectively blending into the 
background and becoming harder for security tools to spot.”16 These 
type of machine-learning powered attacks are currently rare, but 
their emergence signal a worrisome potential trend because they 
could permit malign actors to threaten critical infrastructure like 
powerplants or nuclear facilities, steal personal data on a massive 
scale, or shut down or steal money from financial institutions. 
Identifying the human actor who directed an attack from behind 
the computer was already difficult to accomplish, often requiring 
intelligence gleaned from human spies and electronic sources, in 
addition to the legal authority necessary to trace the code 
“breadcrumbs” through foreign cyberspace. Forensic evidence of a 
malicious cyber-activity’s origin could be masked but never totally 
erased. Enter AI. A decentralized AI system,17 created, released, and 
acting on its own without any direction from a human engineer or 
creator, could substantially blur any attributive link to an actor or 
State.  
Even if a government could point a finger at an intangible, 
cyberspace-bound, decentralized autonomous AI entity (a 
“CyDAE”), what legal authority does a State have to stop a 
CyDAE’s malicious cyber-activities? For purposes of jurisdiction, 
is the CyDAE “located” where a majority of its servers are located, 
or is it where the data it uses is located? Is a CyDAE’s nationality 
 
 16 Steven Norton, Era of AI-Powered Cyberattacks Has Started, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2017/11/15/artificial-intelligence-
transforms-hacker-arsenal/ [https://perma.cc/GV57-UGNW]. 
 17 Per Ocean Protocol founder Trent McConaghy, data localization regulations 
that require data sets be siloed in a particular State will “massively affect 
traditional AI[, b]ut not decentralized AI,” because the “AI compute . . . comes to 
the data.” Trent McConaghy, (@trentmc0), TWITTER, (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://twitter.com/trentmc0/status/1104049106220138506 
[https://perma.cc/F39N-FGG3]. 
DEC. 2019] CyDAE 7 
correspondent to the nationality of its creators, if their identities can 
be ascertained? This AI arrangement adds yet another layer of 
ambiguity in terms of attribution. How can we enable action to 
combat and/or regulate the use of AI in terms of cybersecurity? 
Developing a way to “point the finger”—i.e. impose responsibility 
upon AI, specifically CyDAE, or its handlers—is of paramount 
importance. 
Going forward in this discussion, AI responsibility is essential 
to the different levels of AI development. The term “AI,” on the 
lower-end of the intelligence spectrum, means “systems that can 
emulate, augment, or compete with the performance of intelligent 
humans in well-defined tasks.”18 On the higher end of the 
intelligence spectrum is “artificial general intelligence” (“AGI”), 
which means a “ ‘strong’ [AI] with the full range of cognitive 
capacities typically possessed by humans, including self-awareness” 
as is usually depicted in science fiction.19 The AI discussed in this 
paper fall somewhere between the two extremes. 
This article will provide a brief technological breakdown about 
AI systems. Next, the article will discuss some legal personhood 
theories for autonomous AI systems and then summarize the law of 
attribution. To tie it all together, the next section will use a CyDAE 
example to demonstrate various kinds of cyber-activities that could 
be carried out by AI. Penultimately, the article will apply the current 
attribution framework to highlight the difficulty CyDAEs will pose 
in a legal context. The discussion will end with four bold and 
potentially provocative general proposals in order to guide policy 
vectors. The proposals are: (1) mandatory registration of AI 
systems; (2) a standard of AI system explainability; (3) the creation 
of legal personhood arrangements that require human control; and 
(4) universal jurisdiction for AI that fail to abide by these legal 
standards. Although the threat outlined in this article seems far-
 
 18 SHANNON VALLOR & GEORGE BEKEY, ROBOT ETHICS 2.0: FROM 
AUTONOMOUS CARS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND THE ETHICS OF SELF-LEARNING ROBOTS 339 (Patrick Lin, Ryan Jenkins, & 
Keith Abney eds., 2017). This book contains some of the best and most accessible 
descriptions, summaries, and explanations of AI systems. 
 19 Id. at 339–40. 
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fetched, we cannot allow the next major threat to our society to 
emerge from a failure of imagination. 
II. BRIEF TECHNOLOGY BREAKDOWN 
This section will define and summarize different conceptual 
underpinnings. At least some AI experts consider AI to be “a set that 
contains machine learning (ML), and deep learning (DL).”20 
Therefore, an independent, decentralized artificial intelligence 
capable of engaging in malicious cyber-activities would likely be 
technologically sophisticated, so understanding how the technology 
works may help us understand the legal ramifications of such 
activities. The same is true for deterring, detecting, and combatting 
malicious cyber-activities: without a baseline technical 
understanding, relevant legal frameworks cannot be applied 
meaningfully. 
One of the first approaches used to create AI was a “rule-based” 
method, that is, a programmer would create a set of rules that the 
system would have to check for each decision or instance of 
learning. While rule-based methods have important uses, “[t]rying 
to hand-code a set of rules for a machine . . . to visually distinguish 
between an apple and a tomato [for example] would be challenging. 
Both objects are round, red, and shiny with a green stem on top.”21 
Rule-based approaches are considered “top-down” because of how 
the over-arching rules are applied to the learning process. Rather 
than a top-down, rule-based approach, typical AI models utilize 
“bottom-up” approaches: complex mathematical formulas known as 
“algorithms” parse millions of pieces of data in search for patterns. 
The exponential increase in computing power and availability of 
voluminous categorized datasets opened the door for these 
breakthrough techniques in AI system design. 
 
 20 Oludare Isaac Abiodun et al., State-of-the-Art in Artificial Neural Network 
Applications: A Survey, 4 HELIYON 11 (2018). 
 21 PAUL SCHARRE & MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., 
ARTIFICAL INTELLIGENCE: WHAT EVERY POLICYMAKER NEEDS TO KNOW (2018), 
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/artificial-intelligence-what-every-
policymaker-needs-to-know [https://perma.cc/6UL3-A9TH]. 
DEC. 2019] CyDAE 9 
A. AI Uses and Advantages 
What about AI in general makes it appealing for human 
productivity? “In some cases, their value may come from being 
cheaper, faster, or easier to deploy at scale relative to human 
expertise.”22 Beyond general qualities like “data classification,” 
“detection,” “prediction,” and “optimization” of efficiency, AI 
systems seem to be trending toward “faster-than-human reaction 
times”; “superhuman precision and reliability”; “superhuman 
patience and vigilance”; as well as ability to conduct “operations 
without connections to humans.”23 The utility of Artifical Neural 
Networks (“ANNs”) in particular transcend human capabilities in a 
myriad of fields including “computer security, medical science, 
business, finance, bank[ing], insurance, the stock market, electricity 
generation, management, nuclear industry, mineral exploration, 
mining, crude oil fractions quality prediction, crops yield prediction, 
water treatment, and policy.”24 
B. Machine Learning 
Machine learning is “a developmental process in which repeated 
exposures of a system to an information-rich environment gradually 
produce, expand, enhance, or reinforce that system’s behavioral and 
cognitive competence in that environment or relevantly similar 
ones.”25 In simple terms, “[g]iven a goal, learning machines adjust 
their behavior to optimize their performance to achieve that goal.”26 
So, with regard to the example of a tomato and an apple above: 
[A]n algorithm might take as input millions of labeled images, such as 
“dog,” “person,” “apple.” The algorithm then learns subtle patterns 
within the images to distinguish between categories – for example, 
between an apple and a tomato . . . . Given enough labeled images of 
both, machines can also learn these differences and then distinguish 
between an apple and a tomato when they are not labeled.27 
 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Abiodun et al., supra note 20, at 20. For the authors’ assessment of ANNs’ 
applicability in each field on various data analysis factors, see tbl. 1, fig. 7, at 19–
20. 
 25 VALLOR & BEKEY, supra note 18, at 340. 
 26 SCHARRE & HOROWITZ, supra note 21. 
 27 Id. 
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As AI system design improved, sub-types of machine learning 
proliferated, although in-depth descriptions of those methods are 
beyond the scope of this article.28 Notably, however, the current state 
of machine learning is far from the level of sophistication needed 
for an advanced, standalone CyDAE that would be able to exist 
completely independent from human handlers. 
C. Artificial Neural Networks (“ANNs”) & Deep Learning 
Considering the plasticity and adaptability of the human brain, 
it is no wonder that some forms of machine learning borrow 
concepts from human neuroscience. Simply, “[h]uman brains are 
made up of connected networks of neurons . . . . ANNs seek to 
simulate these networks and get computers to act like interconnected 
brain cells, so they can learn and make decisions in a more 
humanlike manner.”29 For instance, “the network gradually ‘learns’ 
from repeated ‘experience’ (multiple training runs with input 
datasets) how to optimize the machine’s ‘behavior’ (outputs) for a 
given kind of task.”30 
These ANNs, much like the human brain, can create stronger or 
weaker associations between connections in the hidden layers, 
which will result in the AI system’s behavior adapting and adjusting 
 
 28 There are several subtypes of machine learning: supervised, unsupervised, 
reinforcement, etc. For a quality discussion, see SCHARRE & HOROWITZ, supra 
note 21. “Supervised” means the extent to which the training data is explicitly 
labeled by humans to tell the system which classifications it should learn to make 
(as opposed to letting the system construct its own classification or groupings).” 
VALLOR & BEKEY, supra note 18, at 341. Alternatively, “unsupervised” machine 
learning is essentially a programmed form of trial-and-error, without outside help: 
“unsupervised learning methods form clusters or groups between and among the 
objects in an area to identify likeness, then use similarity for classifying 
unknowns.” Abiodun et al., supra note 20, at 10. Some subtypes of supervised 
learning models include single-layer perception; multi-layer perception; linear 
classifiers; support vector machines; k-nearest neighbors; Bayesian statistics; 
decision trees; and hidden Markov models. Id. at 11. Some unsupervised learning 
model sub-types include k-means; expectation maximization; auto-encoders; 
density-based models; self-organizing maps; and clustering. Id. 
 29 Bernard Marr, Deep Learning Vs Neural Networks – What’s the Difference?, 
BERNARD MARR & CO., https://bernardmarr.com/default.asp?contentID=1789 
[https://perma.cc/833M-4RY5]. 
 30 VALLOR & BEKEY, supra note 18, at 340 (emphasis in original). 
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to changing scenarios.31 “Whereas machine-learning algorithms 
require the features they look for in data to be pre-set, deep-learning 
neural net[works] can determine and detect salient features on their 
own.”32 Self-driving cars are a useful example. If the system learned 
what a “bicyclist” is from various dataset depicting or describing 
bicyclists being input into the system over time, then when the 
system detects a bicyclist, it will learn to adjust its behavior over 
time, and eventually be able to “slow down slightly, edge to the left-
center of the lane.”33 
Creating and implementing “hybrid” designs of AI systems that 
incorporate overarching “top-down” rules to govern the “bottom-
up” processes, are critical to the future regulation of AI.34 This kind 
of “hybrid” approach will give developers greater control over their 
AI systems: 
The potential for the misalignment of interest [between the AI system’s 
objectives and those of the public at large] flows from the fact that an 
AI’s objectives are determined by its initial programming. Even if that 
initial programming permits or encourages the AI to alter its objectives 
based on subsequent experiences, those alterations will occur in 
accordance with the dictates of the initial programming . . . [which] 
seems beneficial in terms of maintaining control. After all, if humans are 
the ones doing the initial programming, they have free rein to shape the 
AI’s objectives.35 
D. Black Box and Explainability Issues  
The “black box” or “explainability” problem is a major hurdle 
for AI developers.36  
The term ‘black box’ has long been used in science and engineering to 
denote technology systems and devices that function without divulging 
 
 31 Id. at 341. 
 32 John Fletcher, Deepfakes, Artificial Intelligence, and Some Kind of Dystopia: 
The New Faces of Online Post-Fact Performance, 70 THEATRE J. 455, 459 (2018). 
 33 VALLOR & BEKEY, supra note 18, at 341. 
 34 See WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING 
ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 117 (2009). 
 35 Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, 
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 367 
(2016). 
 36 For an in-depth discussion of built in morality and ethical rules in AI systems 
design, see WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 34, at 73. 
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their inner workings. The inputs and outputs of the ‘black box’ system 
may be visible, but the actual implementation of the technology is 
opaque, hidden from understanding or justifiability.37  
Put another way, when necessary to understand either the 
programming, coding, or motives of a particular AI, the AI system’s 
process is often so opaque because of the sheer complexity of the 
code, or by an advertent wall created by the programmers to 
obfuscate that code. Opacity of an AI system means “the inner 
workings of an AI system may be kept secret and may not be 
susceptible to reverse engineering.”38 “The ‘black box’ concept has 
been exploited by the likes of Silicon Valley start-ups to Wall Street 
investment firms, usually in their efforts to protect intellectual 
property and maintain competitiveness.”39 Opaque code should not 
be permitted solely in order to protect proprietary information, 
shield a company or individual from liability, or evade detection for 
some insidious or criminal reason. 
But, opacity of AI systems may not purely be based on the 
designers’ intent to shield the inner workings of their code from 
view, but might instead be a symptom of the complexity of AI 
system technology. At least one scholar has articulated the difficulty 
AI system designers must face when balancing their systems’ 
complexity, transparency, proprietary information security, 
explainability, and functionality: if algorithms can “be so complex 
that meaningful transparency is impossible . . . [s]hould robots be 
designed to be ‘closed,’ in the sense that they have a set, dedicated 
function and run only proprietary software . . . [o]r can companies 
design robots to be ‘open’ without incurring liability?”40 Black box 
AI would likely present difficulties in terms of government audits, 
 
 37 KYNDI, HOW ‘EXPLAINABILITY’ IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 2 (Jan. 2018), https://kyndi.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ 
Kyndi-final-Explainable-AI-White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HJJ-2M57]. 
 38 Scherer, supra note 35, at 369. 
 39 KYNDI, supra note 37. 
 40 Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 809–
21 (2015). While the issue of liability is only tangentially related to this 
discussion, it is important to note that the manner in which AI creators program 
intentionality or motivation will come up in future legal discussions due to the 
inextricable and unavoidable nexus between mental state and culpability. 
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“especially crucial for critical organizations that are required to 
explain the reason for any decision.”41 
Moreover, the explainability problem may limit the ability of 
programmers and creators to know the source of a problem with the 
AI system’s function. In a discussion of machine learning 
algorithms and facial recognition, professor Nick Weaver noted the 
following serious issues for the technology: 
When applied to face recognition there are huge biases turning up . . . we 
don’t know whether this is biases in the training set or if there actually 
might be technical or cultural features or some other aspects that are 
resulting in these biases and we can’t because these systems are designed 
as unknowable black boxes.42 
But, policy and legislation in western democracies seems to 
highlight why an emphasis on explainable AI systems may benefit 
society. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(“DARPA”), a research agency within the U.S. Department of 
Defense (“DoD”), spearheads AI initiatives that have already 
encountered such problems, succinctly describing “black box” 
issues they expect to confront in developing autonomous weapons 
systems: 
Continued advances [in AI] promise to produce autonomous systems that 
will perceive, learn, decide, and act on their own. However, the 
effectiveness of these systems is limited by the machine’s current 
inability to explain their decisions and actions to human users . . . . 
[DoD] is facing challenges that demand more intelligent, autonomous, 
and symbiotic systems. Explainable AI – especially explainable machine 
learning – will be essential if future warfighters are to understand, 
appropriately trust, and effectively manage an emerging generation of 
artificially intelligent machine partners.43 
In the European Union (“EU”), the General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”) imposes explainability requirements for 
automated systems writing: “the data controller shall implement 
suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and 
 
 41 KYNDI, supra note 37, at 7. 
 42 Death of Section 230, THE CYBERLAW PODCAST (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://www.steptoe.com/feed-Cyberlaw.rss [https://perma.cc/7DX8-8G6P]. 
 43 Matt Turek, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), DEFENSE ADVANCED 
RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-
artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/UET8-FETE]. 
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freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human 
intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point 
of view and to contest the decision.”44 Without using the phrase 
“explainability,” the GDPR codifies the requirement that a system 
be explainable by requiring human review of any AI system 
determinations. Although it did not become law, the EU parliament 
proposed a resolution about AI and robotics, noting the importance 
of transparency for AI systems, highlighting 
the principle of transparency, namely that it should always be possible to 
supply the rationale behind any decision taken with the aid of AI that can 
have substantive impact on one or more persons’ lives; considers that it 
must always be possible to reduce the AI system’s computations to a 
form comprehensible by humans; considers that advanced robots should 
be equipped with a ‘black box’ which records data on every transaction 
carried out by the machine, including the logic that contributed to its 
decisions.45 
Issues surrounding black box algorithms used in popular social 
media platforms have prompted self-reflection by the controllers of 
those platforms,46 but also criticism from scholars who point how 
innovation might suffer from black box regulation. One critic 
explained that attempting to regulate unexplainable AI systems 
 
 44 GDPR, Ch. 3, Art. 22, § 3 (emphasis supplied). Indeed, the eponymous term 
“controller” means a “natural or legal person” that defines the parameters of data 
processing for an autonomous system. Thus, a controller under the GDPR’s 
jurisdiction must be able to give a data subject an explanation as to why an 
autonomous system arrived at its conclusion. 
 45 European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with 
Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, Civil Law 
Rules on Robotics (2015/2103 (INL)) at ¶12. 
 46 See, e.g., Jason Bloomberg, Don’t Trust Artificial Intelligence? Time to Open 
the AI “Black Box,” FORBES (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
jasonbloomberg/2018/09/16/dont-trust-artificial-intelligence-time-to-open-the-
ai-black-box/#103079dd3b4a [https://perma.cc/7S9S-7RLQ] (quoting Twitter 
CEO Jack Dorsey: “[w]e need to do a much better job at explaining how our 
algorithms work . . . [i]deally opening them up so that people can actually see how 
they work.”). Also, in a discussion about Google’s “black box” YouTube search 
algorithm, former NSA General Counsel and former Assistant Secretary for 
Policy at DHS, Stewart Baker said “[w]e are never going to know how this [search 
algorithm] works. Google is basically saying ‘trust us, we’ll do the right thing . . .’ 
I have zero faith in YouTube’s willingness to play it straight.” Tomayto, Tomahto: 
Right to be Forgotten Meets Right to Die, supra note 5. 
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“significantly raises labor costs and thus creates a strong 
disincentive from using AI – as a main reason for developing AI in 
the first place is to automate functions that would otherwise be much 
slower, costlier, and more difficult to complete if performed by 
humans.”47 
Notwithstanding the policy arguments in favor of or against 
explainable AI systems in the current state of the technology, the 
opacity of unexplainable systems will pose serious problems to 
investigators seeking to make attributive links through analysis of 
AI system processes. 
E. Decentralization 
In order to understand how AI use and consume data, it is 
essential to understand how data is stored. Data can be stored in a 
“centralized” way, meaning the data is contained on a single server, 
hard drive, or network, or, alternatively, controlled by a single 
entity.  
Data can be processed simultaneously in multiple locations [by that 
entity]; dispersed for storage around the globe; re-combined 
instantaneously; and moved across borders by individuals carrying 
mobile devices . . . [s]ervices, such as ‘cloud computing,’ allow 
[organizations] and individuals to access data that may be stored 
anywhere in the world.48  
If we analogize data to grain, “centralized” storage of grain might 
be that all of a Farmer’s grain is stored in one warehouse, or in one 
silo, in a building on one farm, all controlled by a single Farmer. In 
contrast, data can be stored in a “decentralized” fashion, meaning 
the data need not be contained in a single, discreet location. Rather, 
data can be separated, and stored on thousands of different networks, 
 
 47 NICK WALLACE & DANIEL CASTRO, CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION, THE 
IMPACT OF THE EU’S NEW DATA PROTECTION REGULATION ON AI 2 (Mar. 27, 
2018), http://www2.datainnovation.org/2018-impact-gdpr-ai.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PB2C-NFUJ]. 
 48 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE 
OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK: SUPPLEMENTARY EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
TO THE REVISED OECD PRIVACY GUIDELINES 29 (2013), https://www.oecd.org/ 
sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7FL-TFP2]. 
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and still retrieved later.49 Using the grain example above, 
decentralized grain storage would mean that the specific individual 
pieces of the Farmer’s grain are stored in many silos, many 
warehouses, or across many farms, rather than just in the Farmer’s 
silo. The grain analogy fails, however, when it comes to retrieval of 
data versus retrieval of grain in a decentralized paradigm. It would 
be nearly impossible for the Farmer to separate each individual piece 
of his/her grain and retrieve all those exact pieces of grain. However, 
with modern computing and advances in technology, data can be 
separated, dispersed across myriad networks, and retrieved without 
fail. Importantly, decentralization does not apply solely to data; any 
network protocol, function, or transmission of information can 
implement decentralization—whether it be computing, financial 
transactions, or communications. 
Many characteristics of decentralization make it an attractive 
approach to computing and storage of data. Vitalik Buterin 
identifies, in relevant part, two key reasons for decentralization: 
Fault tolerance – decentralized systems are less likely to fail 
accidentally because they rely on many separate components . . . [and] 
Attack resistance – decentralized systems are more expensive to attack 
and destroy or manipulate because they lack sensitive central points that 
can be attacked at a much lower cost . . . .50 
From a practical perspective, decentralization happens when 
computer or network operators install a particular program or 
protocol’s software and act as a “node,” that is, software on a 
computer that participates as one point in a network of computers 
associated by the commonly-installed program. Thus, if one specific 
node is attacked or breaks down, unlike a single centralized network 
 
 49 The creator of the Ethereum Network, Vitalik Buterin, and one of the 
foremost thinkers in the blockchain and decentralized computer space, in a 
comprehensive and technical discussion of decentralization, identifies three types 
of decentralization in terms of computer networks: 1) architectural, that is, the 
number of physical computers; 2) political, that is, how many individuals control 
the computer network; and 3) logical, whether the interface and data structures 
that the system presents and maintains look “more like a single monolithic object, 
or an amorphous swarm.” Vitalik Buterin, The Meaning of Decentralization, 
MEDIUM (Feb. 6, 2017), https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/the-meaning-of-
decentralization-a0c92b76a274 [https://perma.cc/R9FR-2YW8]. 
 50 Id. 
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node, a decentralized network can still function even if “five out of 
ten computers” fail simultaneously.51 “[T]he principle is 
uncontroversial, and is used in real life in many situations, including 
jet engines, backup power generators particularly in places like 
hospitals, military infrastructure,  
[and] financial portfolio diversification . . . . ”52 Simplistically, 
decentralization creates a vast fail-safe web of nodes rather than 
consolidating information or computing power in a single place or 
on a single network. 
A decentralized AI system would thus benefit from fault 
tolerance and attack resistance, much like decentralized data 
platforms do. The result would be an AI system with an uncertain 
physical location, immunity to cyberattack, and temporal longevity 
because of the unlikely possibility of accidental failure. 
Taken together, the attributes described above paint a potentially 
troubling picture of an independent entity that, through deep neural 
networks, learns on its own and prevents observers from 
understanding how it works technically because its code is obscured 
by an unexplainable black box, all while being resistant to attacks 
and difficult to locate by virtue of its networks’ decentralization. 
III. EMERGENCE OF CYDAES AS LEGAL PERSONS 
In the recent past, Saudi Arabia granted citizenship to a “female” 
AI called “Sophia,”53 but the act by the kingdom appears to be more 
ceremonial and symbolic than legal in nature. Trent McConaghy, a 
notable AI researcher, presciently opined about “Decentralized 
Autonomous Organizations” (“DAOs”) and their inevitable joinder 
with AI, “DAOs have arrived . . . [a]nd when artificial intelligence 
gets added to the mix, the results are explosive.”54 Similarly, one 
 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Dom Galeon, World’s First AI Citizen in Saudi Arabia Is Calling for 
Women’s Rights, SCIENCEALERT (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.sciencealert.com/ 
first-ai-citizen-saudia-arabia-womens-rights [https://perma.cc/R8XT-X35G]. 
 54 Trent McConaghy, AI DAOs, and Three Paths to Get There, MEDIUM (June 
18, 2016), https://medium.com/@trentmc0/ai-daos-and-three-paths-to-get-there-
cfa0a4cc37b8 [https://perma.cc/3VDT-B4J7]. 
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legal scholar paints the “explosive results” of AI DAOs (he calls 
them “algorithmic entities”) in a much more grim light: 
[b]ecause they lack human bodies, [algorithmic entities] are harder to 
catch and impossible to punish. [They] need not fear death or capture. 
They can replicate themselves without ego and sacrifice themselves 
without motive. They need not recoil at the necessity to do violence to 
humans.55 
So, how will the law handle these non-human entities? How do 
we get to a world with AI existing as legal persons? This section will 
discuss a few ways that an AI might be structured as a legal person. 
A. Legal Personhood 
“[I]t is unlikely that, in a future society where artificial agents 
wield significant amount of executive power, anything would be 
gained by continuing to deny them legal personality.”56 Denying AI 
legal personality out of vanity is one issue, but would it not actually 
be beneficial for people to categorize and legalize AI entities so they 
fit in our rigid legal paradigms? Notwithstanding current technical 
limitations that prevent AI systems from becoming truly 
autonomous and/or self-governing, the state of the law now 
probably precludes AI systems from becoming independent legal 
entities.57 But, importantly, the issue of legal personhood arises in 
discussions about who is liable for the acts of AI systems. Some 
scholars rely on “agency” as the legal framework to support liability 
when people are hurt by AI systems,58 while others point to legal 
personhood arrangements.59 But, other theoretical and hypothetical 
proposals for legal personhood arrangements for AI or otherwise 
autonomous systems are not so far-fetched. 
 
 55 Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U.L. REV. 887, 891–92 
(2018). 
 56 SAMIR CHOPRA & LAWRENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR 
AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 191 (2011). 
 57 Law professor Shawn Bayern disagrees. See generally Shawn Bayern, The 
Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous 
Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93 (2015) (discussing how existing business 
entity law in the United States suffices for bestowing legal personhood on 
autonomous systems). 
 58 See WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 34; CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 56. 
 59 See generally Bayern, supra note 57; LoPucki, supra note 55. 
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B. Autonomous Self-Owning Cars 
One interesting way that people have imagined AI existing 
independently from human beings is in the context of driverless, 
autonomous rideshares that own themselves.60 Much like “the 
DAO” and AI DAOs discussed below, these driverless cars would 
accept cryptocurrency as payment, and use the proceeds of their 
“work” to buy fuel, purchase software updates, and pay premiums 
into an insurance pool with other autonomous self-driving cars.61 
One proposal, “car-ception,” would allow an AI-powered car to 
slowly save up enough money to afford buying a new model to put on 
the road at some point in the future . . . Since the old car is buying the 
new car, it will technically be the new [car’s] owner. It can also arrange 
to have all of its remaining wealth transferred to the new [car’s] digital 
wallet . . . .62  
Indeed, one of the similarities between these autonomous driverless 
car models is that they would operate in conjunction with 
decentralized platforms, particularly blockchain platforms.63 
C. “The DAO” 
“The DAO,” not to be confused with DAOs generally, was both 
a breakthrough and a failed experiment in decentralized technology 
in cyberspace. The DAO was an investment fund built on the 
Ethereum blockchain in which “[p]articipants buy in to the fund by 
purchasing digital tokens, then introduce, view, and vote on pitches; 
the company’s smart code then automatically executes winning 
 
 60 See, e.g., Leo Kelion, Could Driverless Cars Own Themselves?, BBC (Feb. 
16, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30998361 [https://perma.cc/ 
YP45-MNUL]. 
 61 Chris Czupak, The Self Owning Car, MEDIUM (May 8, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@chris_czupak/the-self-owning-car-dd1b39b95748 
[https://perma.cc/RTE5-WP9P]. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Thomas Birr & Carsten Stöker, Goodbye Car Ownership, Hello Clean Air: 
Welcome to the Future of Transport, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Dec. 16, 2016), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/goodbye-car-ownership-hello-clean-
air-this-is-the-future-of-transport/ [https://perma.cc/FN7N-L7FR]. 
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projects” using the tokens they purchased.64 The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) described it as: 
a ‘virtual’ organization embodied in computer code and executed on a 
distributed ledger or blockchain. The DAO was created . . . with the 
object of operating as a for-profit entity that would create and hold a 
corpus of assets through the sale of DAO Tokens to investors, which 
would then be used to fund ‘projects.’ The holders of DAO Tokens stood 
to share in anticipated earnings from these projects as a return on their 
investment . . . .65 
“The DAO” managed to raise $150 million in a private sale of 
its digital tokens, but hackers exploited its programming, resulting 
in the theft of approximately $50 million.66 The DAO’s reliance on 
human beings separates it from Trent McConaghy’s vision of future 
AI DAOs, and at least one legal scholar has proclaimed the DAO’s 
name a misnomer because its arrangement lacked true autonomy.67 
D. The “ArtDAO” 
McConaghy suggests a canvas for a reasonable application of a 
decentralized autonomous organization governed by AI, which he 
calls the “ArtDAO.”68 In essence, McConaghy’s “ArtDAO recipe” 
requires an AI process (ANNs, etc.), decentralized by virtue of the 
 
 64 Ori Oren, ICO’s, DAO’s, and the SEC: A Partnership Solution, 2018 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 617, 618 (2018). For a full and cogent discussion of the DAO, 
blockchain and smart contracts, etc., see Laila Metjahic, Deconstructing the DAO: 
The Need for Legal Recognition and the Application of Securities Laws to 
Decentralized Organizations, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1533, 1544–45 (2018). 
 65 U.S. SEC. & EXC. COMM., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 
21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5BJ4-LHZ7]. 
 66 For a more in-depth discussion of The DAO’s background see Cristoph 
Jentzsch, History of the DAO and Lessons Learned, MEDIUM (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://blog.slock.it/the-history-of-the-dao-and-lessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5 
[https://perma.cc/6HF3-EBXW]; Brian Yurcan, Despite the DAO-saster, its 
creators raise $2M, AM. BANKER (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/despite-the-dao-saster-its-creators-raise-
2m [https://perma.cc/4843-U3UL]. 
 67 Metjahic, supra note 64. 
 68 Trent McConaghy, Wild, Wooly, AI DAOs, MEDIUM (June 22, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@trentmc0/wild-wooly-ai-daos-d1719e040956 
[https://perma.cc/|R8RD-H927]. 
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blockchain, to generate artistic images.69 The AI then “claims 
attribution of the image in a time-stamp to the blockchain” and, after 
creating multiple editions, “posts those editions for sale onto a 
marketplace.”70 After, “[i]t sells the editions” and “transfers the 
proceeds from the buyer to ArtDAO” using cryptocurrency, then 
transfers the rights to the art to the buyer.71 As it continues to create 
new digital art, the ArtDAO earns proceeds in cryptocurrency. The 
imaginative, and winsome ArtDAO seems like a trouble-free 
manifestation of a CyDAE, but as an example, it demonstrates how 
easily an independent and autonomous AI entity could exist without 
human guardianship or oversight.72 
The ability for an autonomous system to manage money, make 
decisions for itself, independent of human oversight or approval, all 
with a particular goal in mind will underpin the structure of 
CyDAEs. These traits that allow AI systems to exist independently 
will function together to obfuscate any CyDAE’s connection human 
handlers and make attribution of its actions challenging. 
IV. LAW OF ATTRIBUTION OF CYBER-ACTIVITIES 
Understanding the difficulties that a future CyDAE would pose 
to the national security of the United States requires a discussion of 
international legal principles surrounding attribution. If a future 
CyDAE were stateless and its location were impossible to 
determine, or if it were linked to a foreign State, then international 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. A full discussion of “blockchain” is outside the scope of this article, but 
the blockchain is an immutable, public, secure, and decentralized ledger of 
transactions, existing simultaneously on many computers. Blockchain 
popularized and most often contextualized in terms of cryptocurrencies, 
specifically, Bitcoin. McConaghy’s ArtDAO relies upon the Ethereum 
blockchain, which is essentially a protocol allowing the execution of simple, 
automatic commands called “smart contracts.” See Metjahic, supra note 64, for 
an in-depth and cogently written discussion of blockchain and smart contracts. 
 71 McConaghy, supra note 68. 
 72 The ArtDAO illuminates substantial legal impediments in the current legal 
framework, particularly in terms of personhood, discussed in Part III, Subsection 
D. 
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legal principles would apply.73 Prominently featured as the first 
discussion point in the 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment 
delivered to Congress, the DNI declared that “[t]he risk is growing 
that some adversaries will conduct cyber[-]attacks . . . against the 
United States in a crisis short of war.”74 Notably, the DNI posits that 
the threat is one “short of war,” meaning the threat derives from 
cyber-attacks that do not rise to the level of armed attack or use of 
force,75 and thus principles of jus ad bellum or jus in bello do not 
apply.76 The international legal community agrees that the law of 
State Responsibility applies, in this cyber context, under Customary 
International Law (“CIL”) and the Draft Articles on Responsibility 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles”) that codified 
CIL. However, the CIL and Draft Articles are not apt instruments 
for dealing with cyberspace issues. The CIL and Draft Articles 
evolved based on State behavior in an analog world rigidly attached 
to traditional norms of territory and sovereignty, whereas 
cyberspace emerged subsequent to those instruments as a dimension 
that both transcends and undermines those traditional norms. 
A. Three Types of Attribution 
There are three types of attribution: political,77 technical, and 
legal. “Technical attribution” is characterized “as determining the 
identity or location of an actor or an actor’s intermediary.”78 “Legal 
attribution,” in terms of State action, “refers to assignment of 
responsibility for an ‘internationally wrongful act to a State.’”79 
 
 73 United States domestic authorities grant the intelligence community and 
military broad discretion in defending against malicious cyber-activities, so for 
the purposes of this article, domestic legal authority is assumed. 
 74 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S Intelligence Community: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 5 (2018) (statement of Daniel 
R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence). 
 75 Id.; see also UN Charter arts. 2(4); 51. 
 76 Jus ad bellum refers to the legal rules governing whether a State is justified 
engaging in warfare and jus in bello refers to the rules that apply during war. 
 77 Political attribution refers to the decision from a diplomatic or policy 
standpoint to assign blame to a particular State, group, or individual for a cyber-
event. The question of political attribution is a foreign relations decision, and 
irrelevant for the purposes of the instant analysis. 
 78 Wheeler & Larsen, supra note 14, at 1. 
 79 Jolley, supra note 15, at 150–51. 
DEC. 2019] CyDAE 23 
Indeed, without technical attribution, legal attribution becomes 
impossible—without technically attributing an act to an actor, it is 
impossible to declare that a cyber-activity reached the legal quantum 
of evidence required to achieve legal attribution. 
B. The Current Attribution Standard in International Law under 
the Law of State Responsibility 
State Responsibility under CIL and the Draft Articles generally 
requires that a State be responsible for its own bad behavior and the 
bad behavior of agents working on its behalf. This body of law pre-
dates cyberspace, and it thus contemplates State behavior in an 
analog world rather than behavior in cyberspace. In other words, it 
accounts for acts and behavior that occur in conjunction with 
traditional Westphalian notions of sovereignty and territoriality. 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the framework, the 
international legal community agrees that it applies to cyberspace 
and cyber-activities.80 There are two somewhat overlapping 
approaches to the State Responsibility framework: (1) the “effective 
control” test, and (2) the “complete dependence” test. The “effective 
control” test established by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
in the Nicaragua Case81 is used to determine whether independent 
actors were sufficiently under the State’s authority and control for 
their acts to be attributable to the State. For a State to “effectively 
control” a group, the State must “direct[] or enforce[] the 
perpetration of the acts,”82 thus demonstrating a high level of State 
control. On the other hand, the even more stringent “complete 
dependence” test requires one to establish that a non-State actor is 
an “organ” of the State; in other words, that an agency relationship 
exists between that actor and the State. The burden of proof for both 
tests is “clear and convincing evidence.”83 
 
 80 See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER WARFARE 29 (Michael Schmitt ed. 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]. 
 81 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 190 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua 
Case]. 
 82 Id. at ¶ 105. 
 83 See id. at ¶¶ 386–94. 
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C. Technical Attribution Strategies and Difficulties 
The challenges of attribution have attracted substantial attention 
from legal scholars.84 The experts behind the second iteration of the 
Tallinn Manual85 concluded that even if a state provides “the cyber 
tools, identif[ies] the targets, and select[s] the date for the cyber 
operation” it would still not necessarily rise to the requisite level of 
attribution to the State under the “effective control” standard.86 The 
difficulty lies in the structure of the internet itself and in its function. 
As one scholar explained, “[t]he totality of the [i]nternet operates to 
deny positive technical attribution to the individual creating multiple 
barriers for positive technical attribution by computer scientists.”87 
The main issue in regard to technical attribution is the missing 
link between the computer itself and the identity of the human being 
acting behind that computer. This problem of technical attribution 
can be characterized as an identification issue: “there are no known 
means to date of positively identifying an author of an attack without 
having physical control over the computer system in which the code 
for the [malicious program] was written and then only if computer 
forensics can recover the data.”88 Locating, obtaining, and 
 
 84 See, e.g., Jolley, supra note 15, at 27 (“[P]roperly identifying the author of a 
cyber-attack is difficult, if not impossible: there are no means readily available to 
identify who authored an attack.”); Christian Payne & Lorraine Finlay, 
Addressing Obstacles to Cyber-Attribution: A Model Based on State Response to 
Cyber-Attack, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 535, 568 (2017) (“The novel 
characteristics of cyber-attacks make the existing standards of proof and degrees 
of control required to establish attribution extremely difficult to determine.”). 
 85 The Tallinn Manual is a guiding document based on “the views of a group of 
renown experts on the application of international law to cyber activities,” 
intended to help the international legal community understand cyber issues. Eric 
Talbot Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and Insights, 48 GEO. J. INT’L 
L. 735, 735 (2017). 
 86 Id. at 752. 
 87 Jolley, supra note 15, at 148. These barriers include “TOR” network and 
proxy servers, which obscure the identification of a computer by bouncing signals 
and packets around global networks. 
 88 Id. at 171–72. Department of Justice attorney, Leonard Bailey, would 
disagree that the task is impossible. Rather, investigators (like DOJ or FBI 
investigators) have tools that can overcome many of the difficulties in attributing 
malicious cyber-activities to an individual or group. Interview with Leonard 
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examining a computer suspected of being a terminal for a domestic 
cybercriminal can already be a challenging task for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) engaged in cyber investigations. 
However, because the FBI has a specialized cyber-toolkit, although 
it may still be difficult, they have capabilities for detecting, tracking, 
and ultimately finding the source of a cyber-crime in the domestic 
United States.89 The Department of Justice outlines several broad 
investigative strategies for dealing with cyber-crime: 
The key methods and sources of evidence for disrupting cyber threats 
include: gathering materials during incident response; reviewing open 
source data; conducting online reconnaissance; searching records from 
online providers; undertaking undercover investigations; engaging in 
authorized electronic surveillance; tracing financial transactions; 
searching storage media; and applying a variety of special techniques.90 
However, identification becomes a tricky exercise when the 
source of malicious cyber-activity originates from a foreign State. 
In these situations, the investigator’s toolbox shrinks. The 
investigator must consider the effect of his/her action on complex 
issues of law, policy, and politics. Often, such decisions would 
require authorization from high-level officials that may be difficult 
to obtain because of the complexity of the issues involved, like 
sovereignty, territoriality, and foreign relations. “[I]nvestigators 
also must work cooperatively with foreign partners to access 
evidence and disrupt transnational cyber threats.”91 The task of 
gathering evidence abroad increases in complexity and difficulty 
when investigators need access to information or evidence in a State 
with which the United States has rocky or hostile relationships, like 
China, Iran, Russia, or North Korea. 
There are three categories of technical attribution: indirect, 
forensic, and, to repeat the more general principle’s name, technical. 
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“Indirect attribution” typically uses manifold techniques, including 
traditional intelligence gathering tools; law enforcement strategies; 
computer forensics and programs; and potential motives to 
circumstantially link an actor to a particular attack. Indeed, a 
determination of motive cannot be understated. And, at the very 
least, using process of elimination could reduce the number of 
suspects to consider; for instance, why would an allied State actor 
commit a ransomware92 attack against the United States?93 “Forensic 
attribution” uses malware evaluation, computer forensics, and code 
analysis to determine who authored the cyber-attack, while the 
specific category of technical attribution uses various computer 
science techniques to trace the signal to its origin.94 
One of the biggest difficulties lies in the speed at which 
malicious cyber actors incorporate and use new technology. Every 
advancement in technical attribution computer science is learned 
and employed quickly by those malicious cyber actors. Similarly, a 
malicious cyber actor need not generate original code to deploy 
malware. Instead, these actors often reuse malware programs; thus 
even if the malware is traced to its original author, it may not 
elucidate who actually used it in a specific attack.95 Likewise, the 
increased use of Tor, IP masking through spoofing and/or through 
proxy servers, as well as false attribution trails make the trail of 
breadcrumbs for forensic scientists long, slow, and difficult to 
follow.96 
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What if the cyber-threat arose from a CyDAE, not controlled by 
a human handler, orchestrating cyber-activities on its own 
prerogative? The rules of legal attribution are difficult enough for 
attributing acts to human actors and States without a sophisticated 
CyDAE intermediary further obscuring attributive links. The next 
section addresses this pressing issue. 
V. THE THREAT OF A CYDAE 
Imagine a decentralized intelligent entity, existing on thousands 
of computers, disembodied and intangible, residing only in 
cyberspace. Both its origin and its existence are unknown. Perhaps 
it is a web or network of “swarm intelligences,” different, smaller 
AI organs that play off each other, contributing to the greater 
CyDAE,97 exemplifying the adage “the whole is greater than the sum 
of its parts.” What is known is that it was created by humans, but it 
is unclear whether human involvement continues to contribute to its 
development. Indeed, “[b]y definition, the initiator of a[] [CyDAE] 
would neither own the entity nor control it after launch. The initiator 
would, however, have the opportunity to set the algorithm’s 
objectives prior to launch.”98 Still more worrisome, unlike the 
ArtDAO with a purpose to create art, or autonomous self-owning 
cars with a purpose to offer rides to humans, the CyDAE’s apparent 
purpose may not always be benevolent and could easily undertake a 
purpose to orchestrate cyber-attacks against the United States and 
its allies. 
The CyDAE with its veritable panoply of malicious 
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its cyber-operations against both State and private actors in the 
United States by surreptitiously monitoring private networks; 
parsing and changing vast datasets after copying them; or infecting 
thousands of Internet of Things (“IoT”) devices100 with “smart-
botnet”101 malware-like programs.102 The following section 
illustrates the characteristics of a CyDAE—based on existing AI 
characteristics and qualities—that would support this CyDAE’s 
malicious cyber-activity.103 
A. Uniquely Effective Characteristics and Cyber-Capabilities of a 
CyDAE 
In cybersecurity, speed is everything. The term “breakout time” 
is a metric for sophistication of a malicious cyber-activity; it 
“measures the speed with which adversaries accomplish lateral 
movements in the victim [network] environment after their initial 
[access].”104 This is important “because it represents the time limit 
for defenders to respond and contain or remediate an intrusion 
before it spreads widely in their [network] environment and leads to 
a major breach.”105 Cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike measured the 
fastest State-attributed cyber-actors (Russia) to have an average 
breakout time of eighteen minutes, meaning it took those actors an 
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average of eighteen minutes from when they accessed the victim 
network to begin causing harm.106 The CyDAE, which can process 
information at beyond-human speeds, could hypothetically achieve 
a breakout time of seconds or less. Such unfathomable speed already 
dominates securities markets. Many Wall Street firms practice 
“high-frequency trading,” a technique in which they use algorithms 
so fast that they can “front-run” purchases of stock. In short, the 
algorithm detects the signal of another entity making a large buy 
order for stock before the buy order signal reaches the exchange, 
races ahead, and purchases all the shares before the first buy order 
goes through, then immediately sell the shares at a higher price to 
the entity that made the initial first buy order.107 The same kind of 
“front-running” technique could be used by a CyDAE to scan 
networks, find defense mechanisms, and modify or adapt its 
behavior in accordance with the type of defense mechanism. 
Alternatively, the CyDAE could hypothetically “front-run” decoy 
signals indicative of normal activity around the network to lull 
defenders into a false sense of security. 
According to CrowdStrike, “[a]fter attackers obtain their initial 
foothold, their first order of business is to get oriented within their 
newly accessed environment before determining next steps toward 
their objective.”108 This deliberative period, for major attacks, occurs 
because the human hacker(s) strategize and plan the next steps of 
the attack, based on the network landscape. It is not farfetched to 
think that a CyDAE, with speed undetectable by humans, could 
deliberate for fractions of seconds and unfurl its digital tendrils 
through the network at the speed of a lightning strike. Even if it were 
detected by network defenses, by the time that the signal indicating 
a breach reaches a human overseer (assuming the CyDAE cannot 
reroute the signal), the CyDAE could have moved, spread, attacked, 
changed its strategy, or deployed decoys many times over. The high-
frequency trading algorithms mentioned above can execute 
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thousands of trades per second, a speed considered slow in the 
industry, which measures performance as number of trades in 
microseconds, or millionths of a second.109 A logical inference then 
is that if an algorithm can execute one trade per microsecond, it 
could conceivably execute one million trades per second.110 Using 
the metrics of Wall Street for the CyDAE hypothetical, a CyDAE 
could cause substantial havoc on a network in the same eighteen 
minute time frame (a time frame equal to one billion and eighty 
million microseconds) it took the fastest human cyber-operators in 
the world in 2018 to get started on their attack once they infiltrated 
the system. By the time the world’s best human cyber-defense 
operator finds and identifies a cyber intrusion from a CyDAE, picks 
up the phone and calls leadership, the CyDAE could have already 
stolen or copied the company’s information, transferred funds, 
and/or modified important data, before making itself undetectable 
again. 
B. Malware Infiltration 
The first step would be for the CyDAE to infiltrate its target 
system—whether the system be a government network or private 
network. The CyDAE’s machine learning ANN would attempt to 
penetrate the system with a phishing attack to gain access to the 
network. For example, the CyDAE could “scrape” LinkedIn for 
employees with access to the network, mimic one of those 
employees’ writing styles, and draft a decoy email to another 
employee the CyDAE determines is a “friend” of the first employee. 
This decoy email would act as a vehicle for the deployment of 
malware on the victim network. 
Many malicious cyber-activities come from “malware,” an 
umbrella term for malicious computer code with many 
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expressions.111 Malign actors often use malware as a method to 
infiltrate a system initially—tricking a user into executing the code, 
a strategy often referred to as “phishing.”112 Once executed the 
malware can execute a ransomware113 program; send “bots”114 across 
the network to hijack computers to use in distributed denial-of-
service attacks (“DDoS”) against other, outside networks115; or 
install keyloggers that record every keystroke on a particular 
computer (including passwords).116 Malware, however, has 
detectable signatures, and in some cases, sends traceable “command 
and control” signals to its operator requesting instructions.117 In that 
sense, malware is “noisy”; cyber-defense infrastructure becomes 
suspicious when an unknown program runs in its environment.118 
But, a smarter malware CyDAE could adapt itself to be less 
noisy, release CyDAE “smartbots” that mutate and either keep in 
constant communication with the CyDAE, act completely 
autonomously, or even sit dormant in a system until it detects a 
trigger to act. If a smartbot program includes some kind of evolving 
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machine learning algorithm, it would not need to send the easily 
detectable command and control signals to the controlling entity 
(whether human or CyDAE), but could instead know the 
circumstances or triggers in the network that signal when they 
should mount a DDoS attack or execute their malicious program.119 
Theoretically CyDAE smartbots could stifle attempts to 
discover it by changing their code as a reaction to their environment 
analogous to the high-frequency algorithm anticipating other 
entities’ stock orders described above. That is, a bot-detecting 
software sends a signal to a human controller alerting him/her that 
the computer is infected by a “bot,” identified by a signature, Code 
A. In the time the signal was sent to the human controller, the 
CyDAE smartbot changes its signature from Code A to Code G. The 
bot-detecting software then sends a signal to the human controller 
identifying Code G, but the CyDAE smartbot then changes from 
Code G to Code W, perpetuating the cycle. The human controller 
starts receiving the signals from the bot-detection software, but 
cannot keep up with the changing smartbot code, and thus cannot 
find it. Indeed, a CyDAE smartbot could presumably operate 
without sending any command or control signals back to the CyDAE 
itself, thus insulating the CyDAE from easy detection. With the 
placement of its CyDAE smartbots, the CyDAE’s DDoS 
infrastructure is set, and it can start harnessing the vast computing 
power of its smartbots. 
C. Data-Based Attacks 
For years, the dark web and sites like WikiLeaks existed as 
repositories for leaked, sensitive, classified, or stolen information 
and data. Malicious cyber-activities aimed at stealing data for 
monetary gain or exposing protected information has become an 
increasingly popular form of attack. For example, self-proclaimed 
“hacktivists” infiltrated Ashley Madison, the dating website aimed 
at people seeking extramarital affairs, and they released user data 
from the site, including “users’ real names, banking data, credit card 
 
 119 DOJ Cyber Report, supra note 89, at 23. 
DEC. 2019] CyDAE 33 
transactions, [and] secret sexual fantasies.”120 Indeed, the United 
States government arrested the Chinese national accused of the 
notorious hack of United States Government Office of Personnel 
Management (“OPM”) which resulted in the release of millions of 
federal employees’ personal information being released on the dark 
web.121 This sort of harassment, which includes “broadcasting 
personal information about the victim on the Internet, exposing him 
or her to . . . harassment by others,” is known as “doxing.”122 
Once the CyDAE gains access to the organization’s network, it 
spreads, and rapidly scans for easily identifiable personal 
information, targeting high ranking individuals in the organization. 
With incredible speed, it sends the data back to itself and into a 
decentralized repository akin to a blockchain. The CyDAE may 
have its own site on the Internet to release the information publicly, 
or could send the information to another website like WikiLeaks. 
Alternatively, the CyDAE could speed through the network, 
systematically deleting the organization’s data, in a similar fashion 
to the Sony hack,123 maneuvering to avoid detection by the cyber-
defenses of the victim organizations. Or, the CyDAE could modify 
the data as it shoots though the network, in an attack called “data 
poisoning,” which targets the learning process of AI systems. As 
discussed above, AI systems, particularly machine learning and 
ANN systems, require vast amounts of labeled and categorized data 
to learn. Data poisoning attacks occur when “malicious users inject 
false training data with the aim of corrupting the learned model.”124 
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In an age when States strive to achieve AI superiority, ruining an 
AI’s ability to learn would be an effective tactic to disrupt the 
development of an AI system, especially when many ANNs and 
other machine learning algorithms are unexplainable black boxes, 
preventing developers from seeing the process from which the AI 
system derived its output or conclusion. A CyDAE could scan vast 
quantities of data, relabeling them (from “cat” to “dog,” for 
example), or replacing legitimate data with fake or inaccurate data 
points. 
Beyond seizure, manipulation, or theft of information, malicious 
cyber activities can result in physical consequences. The Stuxnet 
malware was built to infiltrate industrial systems software, which 
allow computers to control physical industrial processes like 
opening and closing valves.125 Stuxnet caused centrifuges that 
processed material for the creation of nuclear energy at the Natanz 
Iranian nuclear facility to malfunction by spinning extraordinarily 
fast, while simultaneously sending signals to the monitoring 
computer systems that showed the centrifuges were working 
properly.126 Alternatively, some malware can render entire computer 
systems completely useless. If a CyDAE were capable of infiltrating 
industrial control systems in a similar fashion to the Stuxnet virus, 
it could result in repercussions beyond data destruction. Opening 
valves in chemical plants could result in noxious chemical leaks or 
spills. Hydroelectric dams that control the flow of thousands of tons 
of water could malfunction and result in flooding. Manipulating the 
software that controls the timing of traffic lights could result in 
extreme obstructions in vehicular traffic, or even worse, traffic 
collisions. The cyberthreat to such critical infrastructure is real, and 
an entity like a CyDAE could cause substantial physical damage and 
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casualties if it interrupted or interfered with the function of such 
industrial control systems. 
VI. THE CYDAE’S ATTRIBUTION SHIELD 
If it were to exist, a CyDAE’s beyond-human capabilities would 
present difficulty to even the most sophisticated human 
cybersecurity experts. Whether or not a CyDAE could be detected 
and identified are two major questions, but even if they are 
detectable and identifiable, to what degree could the CyDAE’s 
activity be attributed to a human actor in the current legal landscape? 
This section attempts to examine the relevant legal issues. 
The general characteristics of a CyDAE present inherent 
problems to attribution. International law’s two current tests were 
developed in the analog world, where physical beings and things 
could cross territorial boundaries or kill human beings with guns, 
knives, and bombs. 
These legal tests have high burdens. The act-centric “effective 
control test” will permit legal attribution of an independent actor’s 
acts to a State if clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that the 
actor was sufficiently under the State’s control, because the State 
“directed and enforced the perpetration of the acts.”127 This test 
would always fail to permit attribution if the factual scenario 
involved a CyDAE. Even if a State released a CyDAE into 
cyberspace, the CyDAE is not a group, or a person, or any kind of 
legal entity. Neither international law nor any State in particular 
proscribes a framework for an autonomous legal AI entity. 
Moreover, traditional technical attribution techniques already 
experience difficulty tracing a cyber-event to the computer or 
operator. Even if a forensic whiz traced the cyber-activity to a 
CyDAE, the analysis would stop there, as the operator would likely 
have no way of piercing the CyDAE’s unexplainable system to 
gather clues about its programming. Assuming arguendo, that a 
computer forensics expert could infiltrate the black box system of a 
CyDAE, the scientist could potentially gather clues about its origin 
and motives, but considering it acts autonomously, with no 
“command and control” architecture, there would be no 
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breadcrumbs to follow from the CyDAE to its human creator(s). 
Even if forensic technicians could trace a CyDAE’s code to one 
node in its decentralized network, the destruction or examination of 
that node would reveal little, considering the nature of 
decentralization. 
The actor-centric “complete dependence” test requires proving, 
with clear and convincing evidence, that the actor is an “organ” of 
the State and that an agency relationship exists between the two, and 
is even more difficult to prove than the “effective control test” 
above.128 Showing “complete dependence” of a CyDAE on a State 
would be virtually impossible—demonstrating an agency 
relationship between a CyDAE acting autonomously and a State 
would require specific forensic evidence. The same issues arising 
under the effective control test also arise under the “complete 
dependence test.” The unexplainability of a CyDAE would 
obfuscate any connection to the State, and the fact that the CyDAE 
needs no instruction or commands to pursue its programmed goals 
further distances the CyDAE from any States. Furthermore, the 
CyDAE cannot be considered an actor because it lacks legal 
personhood or entityhood. 
The difficulties in attributing malicious cyber-activities to a 
State multiply when applied to CyDAE hypotheticals. Policymakers 
must begin to address such issues so regulatory structures can be 
built before CyDAEs emerge on the world stage. The next section 
contains a series of proposals intended to challenge and encourage 
policy and lawmakers to consider the importance of anticipating the 
existence of near-future, multiform CyDAEs. 
VII. PROPOSALS 
The idea of preemptively regulating AI is not new. Elon Musk, 
for instance, declared: “I’m increasingly inclined to think that there 
should be some regulatory oversight, maybe at the national and 
international level, just to make sure that we don’t do something 
very foolish.”129 Many thinkers in the AI field endorse and embrace 
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the responsible development of AI systems.130 This analysis suggests 
four general, but synergistic proposals with the goal of presenting a 
holistic approach to regulating future CyDAEs, and AI systems 
broadly.131 
Proposal 1: AI Registry 
All AI systems should be required to be registered with a 
legislatively or executively mandated agency or commission. The 
registration would be similar to the way that money services 
businesses must register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network in the United States. The registration would require basic 
information about the creator(s) and/or owner, whether it be an 
individual, corporation, or other legal arrangement. Such an idea is 
not novel: the first decentralized AI marketplace requires 
registration for AI to participate in its platform.132 The registry 
would make basic information publicly available and accessible, as 
well as promote transparent use of CyDAEs and AI systems 
generally. Notably, a CyDAE released for the specific purpose of 
orchestrating cyber-attacks would likely not be registered by the 
entity that created it, so there must be some paradigm to deal with 
unregistered and malicious CyDAEs. 
Proposal 2: Explainable AI Systems 
AI systems should be primarily explainable. Some see benefits 
to unexplainable AI systems, or at least, they view unexplainable 
systems as the result of AI algorithms that process information at a 
level so advanced, that explaining its processes would be 
ineffective.133 Perhaps every step of an AI system’s process need not 




 130 See SINGULARITYNET WHITEPAPER, supra note 97, at 6, 54. 
 131 Importantly, this analysis focused on CyDAEs as a cybersecurity and 
national security threat. However, CyDAEs may arise in other forms, and so many 
of these proposals overlap with benevolent CyDAEs as well. 
 132 SINGULARITYNET WHITEPAPER, supra note 97, at 17. 
 133 See, e.g., Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of 
Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018). 
38 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 21: 1 
learning its greatest value: true patterns that exceed human 
imagination.”134 At the very least, “[w]e need the developers to show 
their work.”135 In other words, policymakers should implement an 
explainability standard that requires, at a minimum, that the 
programmer or an expert reviewing the programmer’s notes be able 
to explain the rules built into its AI system. Of course, that 
assumption requires that the programmer or creator be known, 
which underscores the importance of a registry. 
Proposal 3: Legal Personhood Structure with Human Control 
The most important feature of an AI regulatory regime is human 
control; thus, any AI system, and especially autonomous AI 
systems, should have human-controlled fail-safe mechanisms built 
in so no “loss of general control” occurs.136 Regardless of the form, 
autonomous AI entities need a personhood arrangement so the law 
can handle what an AI entity is. Perhaps the personhood 
arrangement should be an autonomous entity, allowing an AI to 
govern itself. Should that be the case, as a part of that AI entity’s 
incorporation or legal personhood creation, a human or corporate 
overseer entity should be tethered to that AI, with some affirmation 
and/or description of how that human-controlled legal entity 
maintains oversight, no matter how attenuated that oversight may 
be.137 
Proposal 4: Universal Jurisdiction for CyDAEs 
What happens under the framework above if a State discovers 
an unregistered, unclaimed, unbridled CyDAE operating in 
cyberspace, and attribution cannot be made? CyDAEs should be 
subject to something close to universal jurisdiction, considering the 
threats and difficulties—both practical difficulties and legal 
challenges—presented in this article. Cyberspace is everywhere and 
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nowhere, and it confounds traditional notions of sovereignty, 
jurisdiction, and territoriality. Decentralization further complicates 
the issue because it allows an entity or program to exist universally 
with only being partially located on a physical server. Moreover, 
data and computing can shift around the globe instantly, so what 
may be under one State’s jurisdiction in one second may be in 
another State’s jurisdiction the next second, and yet another State’s 
jurisdiction the third second. 
Jurisdiction over such evanescent and transient entities requires 
multilateral agreements on jurisdiction. The likelihood of such a 
multilateral agreement seems slim, considering current global 
multilateral understandings of sub-armed conflict and malicious 
cyber-activities are uncertain, and the global community cannot 
achieve consensus on even those fundamental rules.138 
Universal jurisdiction is the doctrine that permits “any nation 
[to] prosecute universal offenses, even over the objection of the 
defendants’ and victims’ home states.”139 Historically, universal 
jurisdiction applied primarily to pirates because “traditional 
jurisdictional categories did not cover piracy.”140 This proposal 
seeks universal jurisdiction—not necessarily to prosecute—but to 
“summarily execute” a CyDAE because of its existence in 
cyberspace, which is “a global commons” that “lay[s] outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of any nation.”141 Indeed, a CyDAE cannot be 
captured and brought to court in a State jurisdiction. Nor, without 
attribution, can the creator be held responsible for the acts of the 
CyDAE. Therefore, this proposal suggests that an unregistered, 
unattributable CyDAE should be subject to summary destruction by 
any State. This universal jurisdiction would not permit one State to 
destroy the physical computer systems located in another State, 
rather, it would permit a State to use cyber-capabilities to disrupt, 
 
 138 See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 80, at 45–53. 
 139 Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s 
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 183 (2004). 
 140 Id. at 190. 
 141 Id. While the analogy between cyberspace and the high seas fails in many 
ways, the evolution of the decentralization of cyberspace creates a problem of 
jurisdiction. 
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confound, destroy, undo, erase, corrupt, or otherwise destroy the 
program, code, or signals that make up the CyDAE. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The ways in which AI will shape and transform society are 
difficult to predict, considering the inscrutable nature of AI systems. 
AI systems may exist on a different level, outside the bounds of 
human-imposed strictures. As this new and exciting technology 
develops, the world must, at the very least, provide legal and policy 
guardrails for AI technology to prevent it from careening out of 
human comprehension and control. This analysis used the 
hypothetical CyDAE to exemplify potential worst-case scenarios in 
AI evolution. Although hypothetical, the CyDAE idea presented 
here is an amalgamation of existing technologies, AI models, and 
realistic theories. The four proposals proffered above aim to guide 
humanity into a symbiotic relationship with AI. Setting parameters 
for AI system development now will allow a future in which society 
is not threatened by CyDAEs but improved by their existence. 
Indeed, monitoring and regulating AI in the physical world seems 
intuitive—robots have physical effects and liability will attach to 
someone for the results of robotic acts. The esoteric and tangible 
effects resulting from action in the world of cyberspace however, 
are much more difficult to comprehend and fit into existing legal 
frameworks. In Neuromancer, William Gibson described 
cyberspace as a “consensual hallucination experienced daily by 
billions of legitimate operators, in every nation . . . .”142 Much like a 
hallucination or dream, events in cyberspace are difficult to 
comprehend and harder still to predict. In Gibson’s cyberspace, 
several AGI-level CyDAE’s sought to achieve goals not discernable 
to humans; killing, stealing, and maiming in the process. It is the 
illegitimate operators in cyberspace, like the incomprehensible and 
complex CyDAEs dreamt up by Gibson—beyond human 
understanding, beyond the reach of human senses, and with opaque 
motivations—that will challenge humanity the most in the future to 
come. 
 
 142 GIBSON, supra note 3, at 56. 
